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The U.S. Army plans to reduce its force structure and warfighting capability in the longtime allies, partners, and friends in Europe in the future. The U.S. should maintain a credible force and force projection infrastructure capacity in Europe to ensure peace and prosperity in the region. As U.S. forces draw down in Europe it will be imperative to build greater partner capacity and increase military integration and interoperability with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations and other European allies.
At the same time the U.S. plans to rebalance toward the Pacific theater, the U.S.
is struggling with a budget crisis brought on by an economic recession since 2008, which directly impacts the plans for rebalancing toward the Pacific theater. The U.S.
Congress will need to make tough choices on priorities of funding in the budget. The
Department of Defense understands the economic challenges the U.S. government is currently facing. In fact, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General
Meyers, stated that the budget is the number one national security threat to the U. Defense must begin to tradeoff fewer resources for more innovation. 5 The Department of Defense believes it can take risks in reducing total procurement and personnel while maintaining its world-wide military capability. The Army must get smaller but retain capability. The U.S. Army reduction of forces in Europe is the initial actions to reduce total force population and force structure.
In times of declining resources, the Army is also shifting its land power capability through global force realignment to array forces according to regional threats. Since there will be less forces, the Army must realign forces globally to prevent future conflict, shape the international environment, and when necessary employ the force to win decisively. 6 The Army will reduce its overall forces of active duty Army over five years from 570,000 to a lower manpower force and force structure of 490,000 7 and may be required to reduce funding for future procurement programs. The Army will be required to decrease forward deployed forces especially in Europe and maintain an offshore balance emphasizing more theater engagement. 8 Christopher Lane describes offshore 3 balancing as a strategic concept of reducing large formations of ground forces forward deployed in a region and replacing the troop capability with a combination of U.S. missiles, U.S. Navy and airpower to deter potential hostile forces. 9 The Army will redeploy its large formations of forward deployed troops stationed in Europe back to the continental U.S. (CONUS). Troops redeploying from Afghanistan by the end of 2014
will also return to bases in CONUS. The Army will reduce two brigade combat teams stationed in Europe and re-station these units in the U.S. As the U.S. redeploys brigades to CONUS or inactivates units, the Army troop presence and footprint of bases in Europe will decrease. The Army will align forces stationed in CONUS to designated regions. When the Army calls upon these regionally aligned forces (RAF) to deploy, the RAF will be particularly knowledgeable of the environment in the region and this awareness will lessen preparation and training time for deployment.
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As the Army draws down in the European theater, specifically in Germany and Italy, two brigade combat teams and the V Corps headquarters, the remaining units will move and consolidate to facilities on forts and bases. The draw down and restructuring will reduce Army Soldier presence throughout the region, make more effective use of facilities in Europe, and drastically decrease overall costs. As units consolidate to the few military bases, the Army will shut down vacated facilities and return them to the respective European country governments. This will reduce the operating costs of the U.S. Army in the European theater. As the troop posture in Europe evolves, the U.S.
will maintain its commitment to NATO. 
Threats to Europe
Since World War II (WWII), the U.S. has had troops stationed in Europe. These troops played a prominent role in NATO. At the height of troop stationing, the U.S. had over 1.2 million troops in Europe. These troops ensured the security of the U.S.
National interest and the security of its European allies after the war.
During the Cold War, alongside its NATO partners, the U.S. has created a credible deterrence to a hegemonic USSR. Over time, the U.S. reduced its military capability in Europe but has periodically exercised its ability to deploy large formations of forces to the region as a show of force or show of capability to deter USSR from invading Europe. Large division-level exercises called REFORGER were effective in reinforcing U.S. presence in Europe. In order to conduct these exercises, the Army retained logistic facilities and bases in Europe to quickly receive and support large military reinforcements. The exercises were an effective deterrent during the Cold War.
This important concept should not be lost or forgotten as the U.S. looks to draw down the Army in Europe yet again.
History has shown that the U.S. actions in the past to retain or bolster quick military build-up through existing military capability in the region has ensured the USSR 6 had not made any miscalculations about the U.S. credibility and resolve. But, as the U.S. has become effective in reducing the USSR threat, the U.S. allies in Europe have reduced military budgets commensurate of the perceived threat. The European and NATO nation's budgets have declined to a point that it has created a military capabilities gap in procurement, development, and technology between the U.S. and European allies. 15 Although the USSR threat had greatly diminished after the crumbling of the USSR government and the end of the Cold War, the U.S. had concerns about the military capability of its NATO allies. Have NATO allies reduced military budgets too low to effectively assist the U.S. or respond to other NATO nations' call for assistance in the future? This was especially apparent in the 1990s when the U.S. deployed forces to the Balkans. 16 Although the old threat of the USSR has diminished, new ones have quickly evolved or are evolving which the Europeans may not be capable of thwarting.
New threats to Europe are growing at the same time the U.S. has begun to rebalance or focus more military capability and emphasis toward the Pacific where a greater threat to U.S. and global interests are increasingly at stake. This rebalance toward the Pacific requires the U.S. to reduce U.S. troop capability in Europe.
As the U.S. reduces forces in Europe to a sustainable level in which the U.S.
budget can efficiently support, the European and NATO nations must recognize the increasing new threats and their declining military budgets to effectively address these threats. There are telling signs that the announcement of U.S. drawdown in Europe has informally created a beacon of reflection of some European country's security posture.
Europe still remains a pillar of the U.S. defense strategy to prepare and quickly react to threats that may develop in the region. However, European militaries are 7 drawing down force levels due to budgetary constraints. They are doing so independent of each other. 17 The Europeans should use the U.S. concept of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) as a basis to consolidate and pool its resources. Pooling of resources will help the Europeans build institutional capability to assist the U.S. in preventing and deterring potential adversaries in the region and elsewhere in the world. 18 If the Europeans cannot transform to a pooling system of their military capabilities, the U.S.
will lose a good part of their ability to prevent threats in the region. Additionally, the U.S.
will be unable to count on the Europeans for training, integration, and interoperability of militaries to conduct allied and coalition operations in the future. 19 The U.S. will find it very difficult to show legitimacy to forge future wars without building a military coalition.
The U.S. will have to act unilaterally to protect its national interests in Europe.
It is clear Europe, like the US, will be confronted by threats from failing states and increasing non-state actors in the region and worldwide. 20 Particularly, based on the US and European security strategies, threats deriving from failed states may provide the impetus for terrorism, nuclear material proliferation, and organized crime. Some failed states may require multinational humanitarian assistance. 21 The U.S. and Europeans must start now to develop an expeditionary multinational military capability it needs to quickly project its power globally. The JMTC is and will continue to be the facility to train the two brigade combat teams currently forward deployed in Europe. The Army's role is to provide combatant commanders with a sustained supply of trained and ready forces for unexpected contingencies. 26 The JMTC will at some point produce trained and ready multinational forces for Coalition operations. As the U.S. draws down, the plan is to rotate a battalion sized unit from a regionally aligned division 27 through the JMTC in a similar fashion as the National Training Center (NTC), at Fort Irwin, California. The purpose of the rotation of the battalion through JMTC will be to save money on permanently stationing those forces in Europe, expanding multinational training and partnering, and to demonstrate U.S. national interest in Europe. The capability to deploy, train, and employ a battalion combat unit effectively will serve as a deterrent to adversaries interested in taking advantage of a worldwide situation outside of Europe or to create an armed conflict within Europe. largely relied on the U.S. to provide security around the world that allowed nations to trade freely and provide the necessary freedom to prosper. The export of security came at a price that the U.S. can no longer afford. 31 Meanwhile, European nations have invested less in their own militaries. Now, in a time of austerity of budget constraints, both the US and Europe will need to work together to expand strategic and operational partnership as they each adapt to emerging realities in providing regional security. 32 The U.S. will have to rely on its European partners and allies to share the burden of global security. 33 The U.S. Army must retain some credible capability that is affordable but fully capable to prevent nations or non-state actors from initiating hostilities that can result in costly wars. The force in Europe should be agile, tailor-able, and versatile. It must be an expeditionary force. It must be able to shape the environment of its likely adversaries. 34 But, the U.S. can no longer fulfill this role independently. The only way the U.S. can reduce its forces in Europe and still maintain the same level of security is to forge full partnerships with European nations. The U.S. Army must enable European allies through 'mil-to-mil' exercises, training in doctrine and procedures, and share equipment. The U.S. has always confronted adversaries united with its European partners, but the U.S. has always provided the preponderance of the capable force.
The U.S. can no longer achieve the same results with a smaller force. The U.S. will be reliant on the European nation partnerships to shape the future environment and prevent future hostilities. This notion is no longer a secondary thought. Training, advising, and partnering with foreign forces has become a critical skill set. 35 In order to have true partnerships that each can rely on the other, there must be trust. The
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European and other allies' militaries must be able to integrate and have interoperability with U.S. doctrine, training, and equipment. This success can only be possible through extensive training and exercise. Theater security cooperation with European nations builds operational capacity and capability while also achieving U.S. strategic objectives.
Theater cooperation activities increase multinational interoperability and support U.S.
military capabilities. Together the U.S. and its partners can set the conditions to deter potential adversaries. 36 Through security cooperation assistance, the U.S. must be capable in partnering with other nations 37 and quickly expanding its own capability with augmentation from CONUS as required.
An advantage to partnering with European nations is that it is less costly to share the burden. Each nation would provide a percentage of their military to a given cause.
Partnering with other nations would also make it easier to respond to a natural catastrophe or a humanitarian crisis in that particular country. Partnering will make training and access to the country or region much easier for the U.S. Units of the U.S.
military would learn beforehand the language and culture of the country before deploying forces for a military, natural, or humanitarian event. Partnering with other nations would allow U.S. Army forces to exercise military capability, but also apply elements of national power. The Army will align a division with the European theater as the unit to train, partner, and assist with national security cooperation for that specified region. These units would likely be the first unit to respond to any military, natural, or humanitarian event requiring U.S. action. Units forward deployed in Europe have deployed to other regions because of the proximity to the event. The U.S. forces can 13 fulfill a full range of missions both unilaterally and multilaterally, as a lead nation or supporting nation, as needed.
Force Projection
The importance of military forces forward-deployed in Europe cannot be understated. Although the force is small and decreasing in size, the capability to prevent hostilities remains strong. When these forces are not sufficient to prevent hostilities, the U.S. will quickly deploy additional forces from CONUS to augment forward-deployed forces in order to gain an early decisive advantage. 38 The ability of the U.S. to project power in the region and into neighboring theaters of operations such as the Middle East and Africa will protect and maintain US national interests. 39 As the U.S. draws down forces in Europe to a size that is credible and still capable to prevent and shape the environment of potential adversaries, the U.S. must maintain a capability Grafenwohr, Germany and Vicenza, Italy must be maintained to not only project force to other regions but also to receive new reinforcing troops from CONUS into the European theater. These force projection platforms will ensure U.S. and Coalition forces can deploy and redeploy rapidly and effectively.
Currently, U.S. and European transportation deployment infrastructure in
Germany is currently capable of providing the mobility needed to quickly respond to crisis in and outside of Europe. But, as the U.S. reduces and restructures capability in Europe, they must not overlook the power projection platforms. In fact the U.S. and
Europeans must improve the platforms to deploy forces currently in Europe to the crisis and to receive forces from CONUS or other countries. As the JMTC will serve as the integration point for Coalition forces, JMTC must develop a modern and efficient multinational process for reception, staging, onward movement (RSO) of U.S. and coalition forces. It must also be the platform used to project the force into an area of operation.
The Coalition reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI)
process at JMTC will ensure U.S. and Coalition marry-up multinational forces early in the process and maximize strategic sea and airlift assets. Rotation of the battalion to JMTC using a JRSOI process will serve as an excellent tool to train U.S. battalions as well as the multinational or coalition units on the RSOI process for actual deployment into a theater of war.
Most importantly is that the Army improves the JMTC deployment infrastructure capability to a state of the art infrastructure. When called to deploy, the two brigades forward-deployed in Europe will need to quickly rotate through JMTC for validation training prior to deploying to a combat location. The same is true for a battalion rotating from CONUS and also a mixture of coalition forces from various countries. The capability for these forces to quickly deploy from the JMTC to a combat location will be critical. The Army must maintain the JMTC as a power projection platform to ensure units deploy quickly to positively impact the initial stages of a crisis.
Conclusion
The U.S. economic recession since 2008 and the fiscal crisis will cause the Department of Defense to reduce its budget. Additionally, the economic and military emergence of nations in the Pacific region requires the U.S. to rebalance its posture and focus military and other elements of power towards the Pacific in order to provide security and safeguard the U.S. national interests in the region. Consequently, with budget cuts and force reductions, the U.S. Army will be compelled to change its posture in Europe. The Army will reduce force structure, redeploy forces from Europe, and rotate a battalion-size unit to the JMTC. The new posture in Europe will focus more on building partnership capacity with European and Coalition partners through security cooperation and theater engagement activities. The rotation of a regionally-aligned
Army battalion through the JMTC will assure U.S. allies of our commitment and demonstrate to potential regional adversaries the U.S. military readiness, flexibility, agility, and reach.
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The redeployment of forces and rotation of units to Europe will reduce military presence in the region. In order to offset this reduction, the U.S. Army must ensure they focus on effective Coalition integration and interoperability, multinational training and partnering, and maintain European power projection platforms. These offsets will allow the U.S. Army to reduce forces while still maintaining credible capability in Europe.
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